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NOTES
Stay Out For Three Years After High
School Or Play In Canada-And For
Good Reason
AN ANTITRUST LOOK AT CLAETT V. NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the National Football League (NFL) changed a
long-standing league policy by allowing any player who was
more than three years out of high school to apply for "special
eligibility" and gain entry into its amateur draft.1 The
© 2004 Peter Altman. All Rights Reserved.See Tim Layden, Leap of Faith, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 28, 1995, at
104. In conjunction with its stated eligibility rules, found in the league's Constitution &
Bylaws, the NFL has an application for players who have not completed their college
eligibility and are seeking "special eligibility" for the NFL Draft. The petition for
.special eligibility" states: "Applications [for special eligibility] will be accepted only for
college players for whom at least three full college seasons have elapsed since their
high school graduation." (hereinafter "three-year rule"). NFL Eligibility Rules and
Petition for Special Eligibility and Renunciation of College Eligibility (1991), reprinted
in Leigh Steinberg, Representing the Professional Football Player, in 1 LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 6-1, app. 6D (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 2002). It is
the three-year rule that is the subject of this Note.
The official rule of the NFL's Constitution & Bylaws states:
No person shall be eligible to play or be selected as a player unless (1) all col-
lege football eligibility of such player has expired; or (2) at least five (5) years
shall have elapsed since the player first entered or attended a recognized jun-
ior college, college, or university; or (3) such player receives a diploma from a
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modification in the league's guidelines came as a result of
overwhelming pressure from college underclassmen that the
NFL relax its strict standards on eligibility., Previously, aside
from a few rare exceptions, the NFL denied eligibility to
anyone who had not completed at least four years of college.'
Since the alteration in the league's policy, scores of
underclassmen have entered the NFL Draft "early," usually
after playing college football for three years." Despite this
growing trend, the NFL strictly enforces its three-year rule to
prevent abuse of the policy by underclassmen who have been
out of high school for less than three years.' Indeed, the NFL
"vigorously defend[s]" its policy The league publicly states
that any underclassman less than three years removed from
high school should contract with a team in the Canadian
Football League (CFL) if he wishes to play professional
football The NFL stands on its own in comparison to other
major professional sports leagues in the United States,8 all of
which have far less rigid policies on draft eligibility
recognized college or university prior to September 1st of the next football
season of the League.
CONST. & BYLAwS OF THE NATVL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. XII, § 12.1 (A) (1999).
2 Steinberg, supra note 1, at 6-32.
Robert C. Berry, Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports, in 1 LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 4-1, 4-25 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 2002). For
example, in 1989, NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue granted twenty-five
underclassmen a "special hardship exemption," allowing them to enter the draft. See
Layden, supra note 1.
From 1998 to January 2003, 213 underclassmen declared themselves
eligible for the NFL Draft. See CBS.Sportsline.com, 2003 NFL Draft Underclassmen, at
http://cbs.sportsline.com/nfl/story/6097636 (last visited Sept. 2, 2004). In fact, between
1992 and 1997, five of the six number one overall selections in the NFL Draft were
underclassmen. Steinberg, supra note 1, at 6-32.
' The NFL's justifications for why the three-year rule is appropriate are
discussed infra. See Mike Freeman, College Football: Clarett Has Probably Played His
Last Game for Ohio State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at D2. In 1994, Tamarick
Vanover, a sophomore at Florida State University, applied for the NFL Draft. Since he
was only two years out of high school, the NFL denied Vanover's application. See
Timothy W. Smith, Football: Notebook: N.F.L.'s Garage Sale Returns in New Form for
Expansion Teams, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, § 8, at 2. Vanover played one year for the
Las Vegas Posse of the Canadian Football League. Vanover reapplied for the NFL
Draft in 1995 and was selected by the Kansas City Chiefs. See Peter King,
Cornerstones of the Future; The NFL is Looking to a New Generation of Marquee
Players to Lead the Game into the Next Century, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 16, 1997, at
42.
6 Len Pasquarelli, Road to NFL a Long One if Clarett Leaves Early,
ESPN.com (Aug. 6, 2003), at http://espn.go.com/ncf/s/2003/0801/1588490.html.
Star News Services, Tagliabue: Clarett Must Wait for His Turn (Aug. 7,
2003), at http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/sports/6475207.htm.
' For purposes of this Note, these leagues include the National Basketball
Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB).
From 1997 to 2003, 239 college underclassmen and high school seniors declared
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Discussion on this issue arose in the fall of 2002, when
freshman Maurice Clarett (Clarett), a star running back for
The Ohio State University, declared he was interested in
challenging the NFL's restrictions on early entry into its draft.'"
Under the current rule, Clarett would not be eligible to apply
for entry to the NFL Draft until 2005. In August of 2003, with
his college eligibility in doubt for unrelated reasons, Clarett
requested that the NFL grant him a hardship exemption and
entry into the 2004 Draft via the "special eligibility"
application," one year before he would be eligible under the
three-year rule.' The NFL denied Clarett's application, and
Clarett subsequently filed suit in federal court. '
In Clarett v. National Football League, a district court
granted Clarett summary judgment, thereby prohibiting the
NFL from barring his entry into the 2004 Draft.'4 After the
themselves for the NBA Draft. See USATODAY.com, Sportsticker Pro Basketball Note:
2003 NBA Draft Underclassmen, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
basketball/nba/draftunderclassmen2003.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2004). The NBA
allows anyone to enter its amateur draft so long as that person's high school class has
graduated.
See generally, Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis
of the Legality of Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from
Entering Professional Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 539 (1998). The NBA
and NHL have the most notably different eligibility policies from the NFL. The NBA
accepts any person whose high school class has graduated, while the NHL accepts
anyone who is at least 19 years old. Id. at 553-54.
" Gene Wojciechowski, Good to Go, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 2002,
available at http://espn.go.com/magazine/vol5no22clarett.html. Clarett's possible
challenge received enormous media attention, largely because of his exceptional
performance as a true freshman on Ohio State's national championship football team.
In college football, players have four years of eligibility. A true freshman is a player
who begins his eligibility the first year he begins college. A red-shirt freshman is a
player who begins his eligibility during his second year of college. Many red-shirt
freshman, in turn, stay in college for five years, and are called "fifth-year seniors" for
their last year of eligibility.
" See supra note 1 for the text for the "special eligibility" form.
'2 Associated Press, Lawyers Expected to Discuss Case, Sept. 14, 2003,
available at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1615847.
13 In mid-December, 2004, Clarett filed papers with a district court in New
York, stating that the rule, as found in the Constitution & Bylaws, differs from that
found in the Special Eligibility Petition. Specifically, Clarett points out that §12.1 (E)
states: "For college football players seeking special eligibility, at least three NFL
seasons must have elapsed since the player was graduated from high school." Tom
Farrey, Clarett to Use NFL Rule Against League, ESPN.com (Dec. 13, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1684775. Since Clarett graduated from
high school in December, 2001, he argued that three NFL seasons have technically
elapsed (or, under his interpretation, finished) since then (the 2001, 2002, and 2003
seasons). The NFL countered by stating that it is allowed to interpret its own rules
however it likes. Thus, the League argued the rule actually means three seasons must
have commenced and finished after the player's graduation. Id.
'" Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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Second Circuit stayed the lower court's ruling," the Supreme
Court rejected two of Clarett's "emergency" appeals."6 Finally,
on remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit ruled
on the merits of Clarett's claim and found that the three-year
rule was compatible with applicable federal law. 7 As a result,
Clarett was barred from entering the 2004 Draft.
This Note seeks to supplement the Second Circuit's
ruling by offering an alternative legal rationale. It argues that
under applicable antitrust case law, the NFL's three-year rule
qualifies as a reasonable restraint on trade and comports with
the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 8 Essentially, the
pro-competitive effects of the three-year rule outweigh the
potentially negative effects. Recent federal appeals courts'
decisions on issues of sports law buttress this argument. As a
result, this Note takes an additional step and suggests that the
Second Circuit could have validated the three-year rule under a
functional, "hybrid" antitrust-labor law rule. Such an approach
would consider, in analyzing the reasonableness of the
restraint, both the unique aspects of major professional sports
in the United States, and the expansive reading of the labor
exemption as utilized by many sports associations and upheld
by the federal courts.
Part II of this Note will present an overview of the facts
and legal components in Clarett. Part III will discuss how
federal antitrust law applies to the world of major professional
team sports. Part IV will examine several other professional
sports eligibility cases. Part V will outline sports law cases
decided under the non-statutory labor exemption and cases
generally relevant to the disposition in Clarett. Part VI will
argue that the NFL's three-year rule is distinguishable from
similar policies previously invalidated by federal courts and is
therefore justified under this "hybrid" antitrust analysis: the
Rule of Reason, taking into account recent sports law cases
decided under a labor law framework."
" Lynn Zinser, Court Bars Clarett From Draft for Now, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2004, at D1.
" Judy Battista, Supreme Court Rejects Appeals by Clarett, N.Y. Times, Apr.
23, 2004, at D4. The exigency of Clarett's appeals came from the fact that the NFL
Draft was scheduled to occur four days after the Second Circuit's decision to stay the
injunction. Id.
"7 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Lynn
Zinser, Federal Appeals Court Denies Clarett's Bid for the N.F.L., N.Y. Times, May 25,
2004, at D2.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) (Sherman Act).
" See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. The Rule of Reason examines
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II. OVERVIEW OF CLARETT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
Undoubtedly, Maurice Clarett enjoyed one of the finest
freshman seasons in the history of college football, amassing
over 1,200 rushing yards in only ten games for the national
champion Ohio State Buckeyes. ° Clarett's success,2" apparent
lack of interest in obtaining an education before earning
millions of dollars in the NFL, and off-the-field troubles with
the law' led to his decision to file suit against the NFL in the
fall of 2003. From the outset, Clarett argued that although he
had only one season of college football experience, he was
physically prepared to compete at the professional level. 4
In his complaint, Clarett requested that the federal
judge declare the NFL's three-year rule a violation of antitrust
law and grant an injunction2 to prevent the NFL from blocking
allegedly illegal restraints on trade and competition by examining the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the practice and determines whether the practice promotes
or restricts competition. Id.
' Ohio State Clubhouse, ESPN.com, at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/player/
profile?playerId=133626 (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
21 See id.
See Wojciechowski, supra note 10.
ESPN.com News Services, Suspended Tailback Facing Criminal Charge
(Sept. 9, 2003), at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1612236.
See Farrey, supra note 13. All along, Clarett's lawyers argued that college
experience, and not age, was the real issue at hand:
Clarett's lawyers note[d] that Clarett will be eight weeks shy of his 21st
birthday at the start of the 2004 NFL season, and that at the start of last
season there were eight players in the league who were 20 years old. Emmitt
Smith, the NFL's all-time leading rusher, was 20 when he was drafted in
1990 and 'weighs less and is shorter than Clarett,' they wrote. At six-feet and
230 pounds, Clarett already is as large or larger than Hall of Famers Walter
Payton, Barry Sanders and Gale Sayers were as NFL players. Compared to
the top 20 rushing leaders after the fifth week of the 2003 NFL season,
Clarett weighed as much as or more than 17 of them and was as tall or taller
than 15 of them.
Id. Nonetheless, Clarett publicly acknowledged that even if he succeeded in his battle
with the NFL, he wanted to return to Ohio State and play one more year at the college
level. Associated Press, Even if NFL Eligible, RB Wants to be a Buckeye (Jan. 16, 2004),
available at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1710469. This announcement
may have ultimately proved to negatively affect Clarett's argument that the NFL
forced him to endure an economic loss, as he appeared to voluntarily want to play
college football. Id.
' Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973).
The settled rule is that a preliminary injunction should issue only upon a
clear showing of either 1) probable success on the merits and possible
irreparable injury, or 2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to
make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.
Id. at 250 (emphasis in original); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315,
1318-19 (D. Conn. 1977) ("[Clourts have added a third requirement to the showing of
2004-051
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
his entry into the 2004 Draft.8 Although Clarett succeeded in
his request for injunctive relief, he was ultimately unable to
overcome the full strength of the NFL's legal arsenal. The
Second Circuit agreed with the NFL's argument that the three-
year rule complies with federal labor law. 7
The NFL proved its case without the full help of the
"non-statutory labor exemption" rule, which is more lenient of
agreements reached through collective bargaining.' Although
the most recent Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between the NFL and the player's association (NFLPA) did not
include a section specifically detailing the three-year rule, the
union's executive director endorsed the draft rules, and the
Second Circuit recognized this endorsement under the labor
exemption,29 finding no considerable difference between a "tacit
agreement" of this kind and a statement memorialized in a
CBA.' Since draft eligibility has a "tangible effect" on hours,
wages, working conditions, and terms of employment, the court
deferred to the NFL's judgment.' As the Second Circuit found
that the three-year rule was valid under labor law, the court
had no reason to address the application of antitrust law.2 This
Note contends that the NFL could have prevailed,
alternatively, under an antitrust analysis that takes into
account recent federal case law dealing with sports labor
issues. Under such an analysis, the NFL would have the
irreparable injury and probable success, the 'balancing of equities' .. consistent with
the teaching of the Supreme Court. . . .") (citations omitted).
See Plaintiff's Complaint 19-23, Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F.
Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 03-CV-7441), available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/nfl/clarettnfl92303cmp.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
27 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130.
2 "Draft eligibility has been consistently retained as a management
prerogative in the NFL." Berry, supra note 3, at 4-29. The issue of management's
complete retention of the rules on NFL eligibility and the corresponding absence of any
regulations on eligibility in the collective bargaining agreement between the league
owners and players is discussed infra Part V, § 1.
2 Len Pasquarelli, Missing Rule in CBA Could Hurt NFL's Case, ESPN.com
(Sept. 12, 2003), at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli-
len&id=1614334. See also Associated Press, Lawyers Expected to Discuss Case, supra
note 12 (discussing the NFLPA's endorsement of the original implementation of the
rule in 1990).
See Associated Press, Lawyers Expected to Discuss Case, supra note 12;
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142-43.
31 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140 ("[T]he eligibility rules constitute a mandatory
bargaining subject because they have tangible effects on the wages and working
conditions of current NFL players."); see also Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).
2 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 ("[T]he NFL argues that federal labor law favoring
and governing the collective bargaining process precludes the application of the
antitrust laws to its eligibility rules. We agree.").
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burden of proving that its policy does not violate section 1 of
the Sherman Act as a combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade and economic competition." Clarett argued that the
NFL's policy constituted a "group boycott,"' prohibited under
the Sherman Act. A group boycott occurs, basically, when one
group of people (NFL team owners) refuses to contract with
another group of people (ineligible players under the three-year
rule).'
In Clarett, the NFL demonstrated that the three-year
rule has a pro-competitive purpose and effect, thereby falling
outside the purview of the restrictions outlawed by the
Sherman Act.' The NFL succeeded in the difficult task of
distinguishing its policy from similar rules adopted by other
professional sports leagues, nearly all of which were declared
invalid under the Sherman Act." In doing so, the NFL dispelled
the argument that the three-year rule unreasonably and
arbitrarily prevents those who fall outside the policy's
requirements from reaping the economic benefits that
accompany playing in the most successful and prominent
professional football league in the world.
III. FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Before turning to a discussion of the professional sports
eligibility cases that preceded Clarett, it is important to have a
basic understanding of the evolution of federal antitrust law
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)
(citation omitted).
' Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
17 The first challenge to a draft eligibility rule came in 1971 when Spencer
Haywood prevailed in a lawsuit against the NBA's requirement that players must be
four years out of high school. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1049. The NBA's rule is
discussed infra Part IV, § 1. Six years later, Kenneth Linseman successfully challenged
the World Hockey Association's (WHA) rule prohibiting players under the age of 20
from entering its amateur draft. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1315. The WHA would
later shut down, and the NHL adopted an eligibility rule, discussed infra Part IV, § 2,
consistent with Linseman. Rosner, supra note 11, at 554 (citation omitted). In 1984,
Robert Boris won a case against the United States Football League (USFL), with the
court declaring invalid the League's requirement that a player graduate from college,
exhaust all of his college eligibility, or be at least five years out of high school. Boris v.
United States Football League, No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 28, 1984). The USFL's policy is also discussed infra Part IV, § 3.
2004-051
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
over the past century. A survey of the case law in this area
indicates that the three-year rule would be evaluated under a
reasonableness balancing test rather than found to constitute a
per se violation.
As an initial matter, it should be noted that professional
sports are subject to antitrust laws. The only sporting
institution that is exempt from federal antitrust law is Major
League Baseball. ' This exemption, first recognized by the
Supreme Court in 1911, was based on the belief at the time
that professional baseball was not a part of interstate
commerce, and thus should not be regulated by federal law."
Although the Court later changed its view and recognized
baseball's involvement in the national economy, the league's six
decades of reliance on the exemption persuaded the Court to
affirm its initial ruling."° In finding baseball different from all
other forms of interstate business, therefore, federal courts
have long distinguished it from other professional sports in the
United States.41 Since 1955, federal courts have consistently
declined to extend baseball's antitrust exemption to any other
professional sport, including basketball, football, boxing, soccer,
tennis, horse racing, bowling, golf, and hockey.2 As a result,
' In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953), the
Supreme Court held that the business of professional baseball is exempt from federal
antitrust law, reaffirming the principle laid down thirty-one years earlier in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
" Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09. In Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972),
the Court identified professional baseball as "an exception and an anomaly. Federal
Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to baseball." Id. at 282.
Further, "Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the
scope of federal antitrust laws." Id. at 285 (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).
o Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. ("[B]aseball's exemption is an aberration that has
been with us now for half a century, one ... fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis,
and one that has survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce. It
rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs
See United States v. Intl Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236 (1955)
("Federal Baseball could not be relied upon as a basis of exemption for other segments
of the entertainment business, athletic or otherwise."). In Flood, the Court stated
"Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to baseball." Flood,
407 U.S. at 282.
42 See Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1203, 1204 (1971)
(basketball); Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); Int'l
Boxing, 348 U.S. at 236 (boxing); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670
F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) (soccer); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis
Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (tennis); United States Trotting Ass'n, Inc. v.
Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (horse racing); Wash. State
Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pac. Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966) (bowling);
Deesen v. Profl Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (golf); and Boston Profl
Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass. 1972) (hockey).
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these sports must comply with the mandates of the Sherman
Act and the vast array of federal antitrust decisions.
The Sherman Act, enacted by Congress in 1890"3 under
its enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce,"
outlaws all unreasonable restraints of trade and economic
competition." In Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v.
United States, also a 1911 decision, the Supreme Court
recognized the need to evaluate claims of antitrust violations
under a standard of reasonableness, since not all restraints on
trade would be equally harmful to competition. In this way,
"the Court undertook to regulate rather than prohibit private
combinations." 7  Building on this foundation, the Court
established a formal Rule of Reason analysis seven years later,
emphasizing the importance of a thorough inspection of the
restraint and the intent behind the regulation before passing
judgment.' Thus, the Rule of Reason examines all of the
circumstances involved in the disputed practice, both
justifications for and arguments against the alleged
restriction."
Despite an early preference for a reasonableness
balancing test in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United
States, the Court concluded nearly forty years later that certain
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power "Itlo regulate
Commerce... among the several States . . ").
'€ Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) ("[Tlhe
dread of... wrongs which it was thought would flow from the undue limitation on
competitive conditions ... led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition or treating
as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions.. . .") (emphasis added).
'" Id. at 60 ("[Ift was intended that the standard of reason which had been
applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character
embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of
determining whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the
wrong against which the statute provided.") (emphasis added).
'7 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063.
Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
The Supreme Court delineated the test for the Rule of Reason in rather broad terms:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
41 See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text for a more thorough
discussion of the Rule of Reason.
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types of business agreements or practices have a "pernicious
effect on competition and lack... any redeeming virtue," and
thus warrant a conclusive finding of per se illegality."° In
Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United States, the Court
identified group boycotts, or concerted refusals by one group of
people to deal with another group of people,"1 along with price
fixing, division of markets, and tying arrangements, as
unreasonable per se." By 1960, Fashion Originators' Guild of
America v. Federal Trade Commission, which originally laid
down the broad prohibition on "organized" boycotts,' and
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, a case that built on
Fashion Originators, had established "the proposition that a
concerted refusal to deal cannot be justified by any motive or
ultimate goal, however reasonable. '
Nonetheless, within a few years of Fashion Originators
and Klor's, the Court relaxed its demanding stance on group
boycotts in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.' The Silver
Court recognized that a concerted refusal to deal is not per se
illegal when there is an adequate "justification derived from
the policy of another statute or otherwise."' The Silver
"exception" examines whether collective action is "required" by
the industry structure, whether the restraint is reasonably
implemented, and whether procedural safeguards (namely
notice and a hearing) are in place to prevent unnecessary and
arbitrary application. 7 Consequently, if a group boycott, or
" Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) ("This
principle of per se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the
industry involved.., in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint
has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.")
' Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212.
52 See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (group boycotts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
(price fixing); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
affd 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947) (tying agreements).
' See Fashion Originators, 312 U.S. at 465; see also Thomas Lombardi, Can't
We Play Too? The Legality of Excluding Preparatory Players from the NBA, 5 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 32, 34 (2002). ("A group boycott claim arises when a party is injured
due to exclusion from a market in which it seeks entry and when, in turn, the
competition within that market is injured by that exclusion.").
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064.
" 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Id. at 348-49.
See Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for
the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1486, 1504-05 (1966). The Silver exception
requires courts to consider three questions:
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concerted refusal to deal, can meet the standards outlined in
Silver, it will not be labeled per se unreasonable and, instead,
will be subject to the Rule of Reason analysis.
The Rule of Reason approach provides the tools
necessary to more efficiently and fairly evaluate a restriction
alleged to violate the Sherman Act. Despite the progression of
Supreme Court decisions regarding per se violations, the Court
has consistently "adhered to the position that the inquiry
mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged
agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition."" In short, the Rule of Reason's focus
on viewing the totality of circumstances 9 behind the disputed
business agreement or practice does not detract from the power
of the Sherman Act, but more accurately gives the statute
"flexibility and definition."' Furthermore, the Rule of Reason
relies on a determination of the "competitive impact" and on an
"economic analysis" of the situation." Courts continue to rely on
the standards set forth in Board of Trade nearly 85 years ago,
including the unique qualities of the business, and the extent,
rationale, and effects of the restraint.62
Since Silver, courts have reserved the per se approach
for "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition. "' The Supreme Court has emphasized that
"formalistic line drawing," or blindly declaring group boycotts
per se invalid despite the lack of a "demonstrable economic
effect," is impermissible.' As a result, since "by its very nature
(a) Was the association's action intended to accomplish an end which was
within the contemplation of the policy justifyring self-regulation or consistent
with the necessities of industry structure? (b) Was the restraint imposed by
the association reasonably related to achieving this goal, and no more
extensive than necessary to do so? (c) Did the association provide procedural
safeguards which assured that the restraint was not arbitrary and which
furnished a basis for judicial review?
Id. at 1504-05 (footnote omitted).
" Natl Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (citing
Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) and Cont'l T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
' Cont'i T.V., 433 U.S. at 49 ("Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.").
Nat'l Soc'y, 435 U.S. at 688.
61 Id. at 691 n.17 (discussing Cont'l TV., 433 U.S. 36). "[Tihe purpose of the
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is
not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the
interest of the members of an industry." Id. at 692.
12 Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
Cont'l TV., 433 U.S. at 58-59.
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the per se approach paints with a very broad brush and
eliminates economic cooperation which may be both necessary
and desirable," federal courts now generally favor Rule of
Reason analysis. 5 In addition, and more importantly for the
purposes of this Note, federal courts appreciate "the unique
characteristics of professional sports competition" and
understand the need to flexibly apply a reasonableness
balancing test to disputed practices.' Despite today's
preference for the Rule of Reason, however, the majority of
courts deciding eligibility cases from professional sports over
the past thirty years have refused to embark on detailed and
factually-based reasonableness balancing tests.
IV. ELIGIBILITY CASES IN OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Clarett's challenge to the NFL's three-year rule followed
a host of federal court cases in which aspiring athletes took on
large professional sports organizations in an effort to change
league rules. A discussion of professional sports draft eligibility
cannot begin without a thorough analysis of Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management,7 the case that secured Spencer
Haywood's spot in the National Basketball Association (NBA)
and opened the door to an era of antitrust challenges to
professional sports league practices. In addition, three other
eligibility cases, Linseman v. World Hockey Association,' Boris
v. United States Football League," and Bowman v. National
Football League,7" provide useful background to an antitrust
view of Clarett.
A. Spencer Haywood Paves the Way
For Clarett, Haywood's historic battle against the NBA
provided the main precedent for an attack on the NFL's three-
year rule, as Haywood sustained his claim all the way through
a Supreme Court ruling on the validity of the NBA's draft
eligibility rule.7 For the NFL, Denver Rockets revealed the
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064.
Samuel M. Chambliss, III, Professional Football's Four-Or-Five-Year
Eligibility Rule: High Time to Punt, 14 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 517, 524-527 (1984)
(outlining the "uniqueness of the business of competitive team sports").
"7 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
68 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
6 No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
'0 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975).
71 See Luke Cyphers, Haywood's been in Clarett's shoe, ESPN.com (Sept. 5,
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deficiencies in the NBA's justifications for its hard-and-fast
rule restricting the entry of amateur athletes into the NBA-
and what the NFL could do to avoid similar deficiencies. As the
seminal case for sports eligibility litigation pre-Clarett, Denver
Rockets provides an important indicator of the Second Circuit's
subsequent decision in Clarett.
In 1971, Haywood successfully challenged the NBA's
requirement that a player could not enter the league's amateur
draft until four years after the date of his high school
graduation.72 Prior to his legal efforts, Haywood enjoyed
extraordinary success as both an amateur and professional
basketball player, winning "All-American" honors in high
school, junior college, and college, as well as an Olympic medal
in the 1968 Summer Games." After spending one season at the
University of Detroit, Haywood signed a contract with the
Denver Rockets (Rockets), a team in the American Basketball
Association (ABA), where he earned "Rookie of the Year"
honors.' During November of the following season, Haywood
2003), at http:/lsports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1609921.
72 See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1059. Section 2.05 of the bylaws of the
NBA provides as follows:
High School Graduate, etc. A person who has not completed high school or
who has completed high school but has not entered college, shall not be
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until four years after he has been
graduated or four years after his original high school class has been
graduated, as the case may be, nor may the future services of any such
person be negotiated or contracted for, or otherwise reserved. Similarly, a
person who has entered college but is no longer enrolled, shall not be eligible
to be drafted or to be a Player until the time when he would have first become
eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any negotiations or agreements
with any such person during such period shall be null and void and shall
confer no rights whatsoever; nor shall a Member violating the provisions of
this paragraph be permitted to acquire the rights to the services of such
person at any time thereafter.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting NBA Bylaws in effect during the 1970-71 season).
Section 6,03 provides as follows:
Persons Eligible for Draft. The following classes of persons shall be eligible
for the annual draft:
(a) Students in four year colleges whose classes are to be graduated
during the June following the holding of the draft;
(b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have
already been graduated, and who do not choose to exercise
remaining collegiate basketball eligibility;
(c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have
already been graduated if such students have no remaining
collegiate basketball eligibility;
(d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions of
Section 2.05 of these By-laws.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting NBA Bylaws in effect during the 1970-71 season).
'3 Id. at 1052.
" Id. at 1060 (noting Haywood was granted eligibility from the ABA, a
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and the Rockets had a dispute over the terms of Haywood's
contract, ultimately resulting in Haywood's departure from the
team.75 Shortly thereafter, in late December, Haywood agreed
to a six-year contract with the Seattle Supersonics (Sonics), an
NBA team, despite the fact that both Haywood and the Sonics
were well aware of the league's bylaws and that Haywood was
not yet eligible under the four-year rule."6 Not surprisingly,
then-NBA Commissioner Walter Kennedy immediately
"disapproved" the contract between Haywood and the Sonics on
the basis of Haywood's ineligibility, and threatened sanctions
against the team for its unlawful conduct.77 Two days later,
Haywood petitioned a California district court for a preliminary
injunction, asking the court to secure his right to play in the
NBA until the conclusion of a thorough hearing on the merits
of his contention that the NBA's four-year rule constituted a
"group boycott" in violation of the Sherman Act."
The injunction was initially granted on February 2,
1971, with District Judge Ferguson finding that the NBA's rule
was likely a per se violation of the Sherman Act, since group
boycotts are per se illegal.9 Judge Ferguson supported his grant
of the preliminary injunction by stating that: (1) the NBA's rule
was in furtherance of an alleged violation of federal antitrust
law; (2) there was a substantial likelihood that Haywood would
succeed on the merits at trial; (3) Haywood would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction were denied; and (4) the
NBA did not deserve equitable relief on the matter.8
The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction, and the case
was argued shortly thereafter before Justice Douglas of the
league no longer in operation, pursuant to a "hardship exemption" from that league's
four-year college rule, one similar to the NBA's rule).
"5 Id. at 1054 ("On November 23, 1970, Haywood gave written notice to
Denver that he considered his contract with Denver to be invalid by reason of
fraudulent misrepresentations made by Denver to him, and that he disavowed and
rescinded said contract.").
76 Denver Rockets, ;-25 F.Supp. at 1054.
Id. at 1060. On January 12, 1971, fifteen days after Haywood signed his
contract with the Sonics, the Commissioner stated: "The Board of Governors . . . have
passed a resolution directing the Commissioner . . . to consider bringing charges
against Seattle ... in connection with the Spencer Haywood matter and to advise the
Board of the most drastic penalties lawfully at its command if such charges should be
sustained." Id. at 1060. "This means expulsion of the franchise through various other
levels, including fines, suspending draft choices." Id. at 1057.
76 Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1058 (noting that District Judge Ferguson stated that the
reasonableness of the rule is no defense to its illegality).
'* Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1058; see also Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta
Corp., 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Supreme Court," who reinstated the injunction and sent the
case back to the district court for fact-finding.82 Justice Douglas
cited the district court's conclusion that the injunction would
prevent the NBA from inflicting "irreparable harm" on
Haywood, who only had a limited window of time to play
professional basketball.' Although Justice Douglas alluded to
applicable antitrust law, his decision rested largely on
equitable considerations and an interest in maintaining the
status quo (as it stood after Haywood signed with the Sonics).'
The district court issued its opinion on the merits little more
than two months after Haywood's initial application for relief.'
Undoubtedly, Judge Ferguson"6 relied a good deal on the
conclusions he reached in his initial grant of the injunction-
namely a concern for Haywood's career and the lack of
substantive harm the NBA would endure from Haywood's
entrance into the league.'
In many ways, Haywood was a perfect candidate to
challenge the four-year rule. The court continually emphasized
his impressive credentials, and how it was "uncontested" that
Haywood was "qualified to play basketball at the high level of
" Id. at 1060.
Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1206 (1971) ("[The]
group boycott issue in professional sports is a significant one.").
Id. at 1205 (citing Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1057). The court in
Denver Rockets was moved by a concern for Haywood suffering "irreparable injury in
that a substantial part of his playing career will have been dissipated,... his public
acceptance as a super star will diminish to the detriment of his career, and a great
injustice will be perpetrated on him." Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1057.
' See Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1206-07. Justice Douglas issued his opinion on
March 1, shortly before the NBA Playoffs were to commence. "The matter is of some
urgency because the athletic contests are under way and the playoffs between the
various clubs will begin on March 23. To dissolve the stay would preserve the interest
and integrity of the playoff system, as I have indicated." Id. The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, later affirmed Justice Douglas' opinion. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060.
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
Id. at 1051. Judge Ferguson's opinion on the "Motion for Preliminary
Injunction Against Cross-Defendant National Basketball Association," decided Feb. 2,
1971, and his "Opinion Granting Partial Summary Judgment," decided Mar. 22, 1971,
are both embodied in 325 F. Supp. 1049.
Id. at 1057 ('Participating in professional basketball as a player against
the best competition which the sport has to offer is as necessary to the mental and
physical well being of Haywood as is breathing, eating and sleeping.").
Id. at 1058 ('There is no evidence that the granting of the relief requested
by [Haywood] will open the door to other allegedly ineligible college basketball players
being recruited by NBA teams .... No monetary injury will result to the NBA by
reason of the granting on the Preliminary Injunction."). The strength of these
arguments, especially with regard to whether the granting of an exemption or changing
of the rule has a long-term effect, is discussed infra in terms of the NFL's three-year
rule.
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competency required of NBA players."9 In this regard,
Haywood's exemplary professional skills may have made him a
more sympathetic plaintiff, thereby providing an additional
justification for ultimately finding the NBA's four-year rule in
violation of the Sherman Act.
In any event, the district court granted Haywood partial
summary judgment, firmly holding the four-year rule per se
illegal as a "group boycott" prohibited by the Sherman Act.'
The court held that this "primary concerted refusal to deal"
prevented people like Haywood, or those otherwise qualified to
play in the NBA, "but for"" their ineligibility under the four-
year rule, from contracting with NBA team owners? As a
result, Haywood and other similarly situated players suffered
three harms: (1) the boycott victimized the excluded player by
not allowing him to enter a desired market; (2) the boycott
injured competition within that market since the excluded
player could not sell his services; and (3) the boycott allowed
NBA team owners to pool their economic power and collectively
establish their own "private government." 4 These initial
observations lay the foundation for Judge Ferguson's ultimate
finding that the NBA's four-year rule was per se illegal under
the Sherman Act and need not be examined under the Rule of
Reason.
In reaching this conclusion, the court made two
determinations regarding the Rule of Reason and the NBA's
four-year rule. First, the court articulated its hesitation in
employing the Rule of Reason over a per se approach because
"it requires difficult and lengthy factual inquiries and very
subjective policy decisions which are in many ways essentially
legislative and ill-suited to the judicial process." 5 The court was
simply unwilling to make judgments on the value of the rule to
the NBA or the rationale behind the four-year requirement.
Second, the court examined Silver, ruling that the NBA
could not satisfy any of the Supreme Court's requirements to
qualify for an exception to the general rule of per se illegality
Id. at 1061.
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066-67.
Id. at 1061 (internal quotation omitted).
2 Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1061.
Id. (noting that with regard to the third harm, "[olf course, this is true only
where members of the combination possess market power in a degree approaching a
shared monopoly. This is uncontested in the present case").
'6 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063.
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for group boycotts.' As with other lower federal court judges,
Judge Ferguson evaluated Silver with caution, trying to
correctly apply the three standards within the Court's intended
boundaries. 7 In examining prongs two and three,' Judge
Ferguson identified the Silver Court's emphasis on notice and a
hearing as effective tools to "determine whether the self-
regulation is justified, necessary and sufficiently limited."'
Under this framework, the court found that the four-year rule
could not escape per se invalidity.' The NBA did not employ
any "procedural safeguards"1"1 to guard against arbitrary and
overly broad application of the rule. °2 Specifically, the league
provided no means for a player like Haywood to file a
"rudimentary" petition, or special application for eligibility,
based on his own individual circumstances. '
With regard to the first prong of the Silver test,' Judge
Ferguson only briefly mentioned the merits behind the NBA's
attempt to self-regulate, and did not fully explore the necessity
for doing so in the world of professional sports. 5 The court's
superficial analysis of the first prong may well have come in
reaction to the weak arguments set forth by the NBA in
support of their four-year rule. The court balked at the NBA's
9' Id. at 1066.
' See Rosner, supra note 9 at 544 ("Though determining the precise scope of
the so-called Silver exception has been a somewhat difficult task for lower courts, three
requirements have generally been espoused....").
" Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1065. The second and third prongs
required under the Silver exception read as follows:
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with
the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is reasonably related to that goal, and
(c) is no more extensive than necessary.
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which assure that the re-
straint is not arbitrary and which furnishes a basis for judicial review.
Id. at 1065.
Id. (citing Silver, 373 U.S. at 363).
10' Id. at 1066.
11 Silver, 373 U.S. at 363.
o Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
'o Id. ("It is clear from the constitution and by-laws of the NBA that there is
no provision for even the most rudimentary hearing before the four-year college rule is
applied to exclude an individual player.").
01 Id. at 1064-65. The first prong required under the Silver exception reads as
follows:
(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation "or otherwise." In
discussing the history of the New York Stock Exchange in Silver, the Court
suggests that self-regulation is inherently required by the market's structure.
From this basis, it has been argued that where collective action is required by
the industry structure, it falls within the 'or otherwise' provision of Silver.
Id. (citations omitted).
105 See Rosner, supra note 9 at 552.
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arguments concerning financial necessity, the rule's indirect
promotion of obtaining a college education, and the use of
college basketball as a "more efficient and less expensive way of
training young professional basketball players than the so-
called 'farm team' system.'. In short, the court held that the
NBA's four-year rule was "overly broad," "improper," and
unnecessarily "absolute."' 7
The importance of Denver Rockets continued for many
years to come. Shortly after the case, the NBA established a
financial "hardship rule" for players like Haywood, and
eventually changed its rule entirely to allow anyone whose high
school class has graduated to enter the league's amateur
draft. 8 Haywood cleared the way for some of today's NBA
superstars, like Kobe Bryant, Kevin Garnett, Tracy McGrady,
and Jermaine O'Neal, to forgo college entirely and enter the
NBA draft, often within weeks of high school graduation."'
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, Denver Rockets
provided a "legal manual" for Clarett in his battle against the
NFL.
In an effort to draw parallels between himself and
Haywood, Clarett's complaint detailed his many
accomplishments."' Clarett received numerous "player of the
year" honors after his senior season of high school and was
largely regarded as the best freshman running back in all of
college football after his first year at Ohio State."' Despite
these achievements, the Second Circuit likely viewed Clarett as
strikingly different from Haywood in one key regard. While
Clarett challenged the three-year rule as an amateur, Haywood
challenged the NBA's four-year rule as a professional
basketball player. This fact may have made Clarett a far less
sympathetic plaintiff than Haywood, since Clarett did not
choose to file suit against the NFL until after he lost his
eligibility to play college football at Ohio State during his
sophomore year. As a result, while Haywood was already
making a living playing professional basketball, Clarett was a
scholarship athlete at a prestigious national university whose
116 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
107 Id. ("[lit is uncontested that the rules in question are absolute and prohibit
the signing of not only college basketball players but also those who do not desire to
attend college and even those who lack the mental and financial ability to do so.").
1' See Rosner, supra note 9 at 553.
"' See Lombardi, supra note 53 at 39.
"' See Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 26.
"' Id.
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off-the-field improprieties led to his removal from the Buckeye
football team.' While this distinction may have had no legal
ramifications, the Denver Rockets court could very well have
been partially motivated by sympathy for Haywood.
B. Kenneth Linseman Sets the Eligibility Standard for
Professional Hockey
Six years after Haywood's successful claim, Kenneth
Linseman, a 19 year-old Canadian amateur hockey player,
challenged the validity of the World Hockey Association's
(WHA) rule that no person under the age of 20 could play in
the league."' Although Denver Rockets was the predominant
authority Clarett relied on in his challenge to the NFL's three-
year rule, Linseman, a Second Circuit case, explicitly outlined
the deficiencies in the WHA's rule and the appropriateness of
relief for a plaintiff in a similar situation.
In Linseman, the Birmingham Bulls, a WHA team,
selected the plaintiff in the annual league amateur draft, only
to be informed by the league office that the selection was "null
and void" under the so-called "twenty year old rule.""
Linseman petitioned a federal court for injunctive relief, and
District Judge Clarie found that the practice constituted a per
se illegal group boycott under the Sherman Act."' Although
Judge Clarie largely relied on Denver Rockets as a basis for the
opinion, Linseman provides a useful application of the Silver
exception.
Judge Clarie held that irreparable injury was
essentially unavoidable without a preliminary injunction, since
Linseman would lose a professional salary and exposure to a
high level of competition if blocked from the WHA-thereby
injuring a career that already has only a limited window for
growth and opportunity."' Furthermore, Judge Clarie
compared Linseman's case to Haywood, suggesting Linseman
could lose the chance to achieve "superstar" status if he had to
remain at the amateur level for another year. ' Clarett set
1"' See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
".. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. 1315.
Id. at 1317-18.
'1' Id. at 1320-21.
".. Id. at 1319 ("The career of a professional athlete is more limited than that
of persons engaged in almost any other occupation. Consequently the loss of even one
year of playing time is very detrimental.").
"' Id. at 1319 ("By playing in the WHA, Linseman may achieve the status of a
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forth similar and, in many ways, equally compelling arguments
to those advanced by Linseman, as it is indisputable that
professional athletes only have a certain amount of time that
they may make use of their athletic skills."' However, unlike
Clarett, who could make a significant salary and sign
endorsement contracts if he played in the CFL for one year
before becoming eligible for the NFL, Linseman did not have
another way to play professional hockey outside of the WHA.
Linseman also details why the WHA's "twenty year old
rule" does not qualify for the Silver exception. Judge Clarie
refused to apply the Rule of Reason, since the WHA could likely
not demonstrate that even one of the requirements of Silver
applied to its eligibility rule. First, Judge Clarie held that the
free market should dictate who is and who is not fit to play
professional hockey."9 Second, the court dismissed the WHA's
argument that the restrictive eligibility rule was necessary to
facilitate the growth of talent in the Canadian junior hockey
league.' The court bluntly stated that economic necessity does
not permit violations of federal antitrust law. 2' Third, Judge
Clarie held that the WHA provided none of the procedural
safeguards envisioned by the Silver court, namely the
opportunity for a hearing to ask for a "hardship exemption.".2
The court asserted that should the preliminary
injunction not issue, Linseman would suffer a far greater harm
than the WHA.'2 Consequently, Judge Clarie ruled in favor of
Linseman, as his probability of success at trial was
overwhelming.'24 In doing so, the court reaffirmed many of the
principles laid down in Denver Rockets, including the federal
system's disinclination to uphold restrictive trade practices.
'superstar' which would bring him financial and emotional rewards in excess of his
salary from [his amateur team]. Such rewards are not available to... [amateur players
since they do] not receive the same notoriety... as... WHA [players].").
"' See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1319-20.
.. Id. at 1321.
120 Id. at 1322.
"' Id. ("If the WHA needs a training ground for its prospective players, the
principles of the free market system dictate that it bear the cost of that need by
establishing its own farm system.").
" Id. The court concluded its discussion of the Silver exception by stating
that the WHA's rule "is a blanket restriction as to age without any consideration of
talent." Id. at 1323.
'2 Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1325.
"' Id. at 1325-26.
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C. Robert Boris Challenges the USFL
Another draft eligibility case, Boris v. United States
Football League, decided in 1984, struck down a rule that
prevented players from joining the USFL until expiration of
the player's college eligibility or five years after the player
started college.'2' In a factual setting quite similar to that of
Clarett, Robert Boris, a varsity football player who voluntarily
withdrew from the University of Arizona in the middle of his
third season of college eligibility, brought a challenge to the
rule on the basis that it constituted an illegal group boycott.''
The rule was nearly identical, word for word, to the one found
in the present version of the NFL's Constitution & Bylaws.'27 At
the time, however, the USFL did not have the same type of
"Special Eligibility Rule" that the NFL maintains today.' 8
A district court in California, the same court which
found for Spencer Haywood more than a decade earlier, agreed
with Boris, holding that the USFL's rule was a per se violation
of the Sherman Act.'29 In a relatively short opinion, District
Judge Waters refused to consider the potential reasonableness
of the rule, other than to list the USFL's creative, yet
ultimately unsustainable, justifications."' Judge Waters'
... 1984 WL 894 at *1. The USFL launched in 1984 and lasted for three
seasons. The games were played in the spring in an effort to attract fans who wanted to
watch football on a year-round basis (the NFL's season runs from August until
February). See also Rosner, supra note 9 at 555-56.
128 Id. at *1-2.
"' See supra note 1 and accompanying text. "No person shall be eligible to
play or be selected as a player unless (1) all college football eligibility of such player has
expired, or (2) at least five (5) years shall have elapsed since the player first entered or
attended a recognized junior college, college or university or (3) such player received a
diploma from a recognized college or university." USFL CONST. & BYLAWS (reprinted in
1984 WL 894 at *1).
"2 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
1984 WL 894 at *1.
130 Id. at *2. The USFL offered a host of justifications for its Rule:
The reasons advanced by the defendants in support of the Eligibility Rule...
are (in summary): The Eligibility Rule promotes on-field competitive balance
among USFL teams; very few college athletes are physically, mentally, or
emotionally mature enough for professional football; abolition of the
Eligibility Rule will not benefit the college athlete; the Eligibility Rule
promotes the concept of the importance of a college education; the Eligibility
Rule promotes the efficient operation of the USFL by strengthening the sport
at the college level so that the USFL does not have to develop players at that
level; the Eligibility Rule is not inflexible; since 1983 was the USFL's first
season of play, competitive conditions required it to adopt and enforce the
same Eligibility Rule previously adopted and enforced by the two powerful
and established major professional football leagues [the NFL and the CFL], if
it cannot enforce the Eligibility Rule, its very existence will be threatened,
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opinion addressed two important points for the purposes of
Clarett. First, part of the court's rationale for its holding in
Boris undoubtedly came from the USFL's grant of eligibility to
Herschel Walker one year earlier. Walker, winner of the 1982
Heisman Trophy Award, given annually to the top player in
college football, left the University of Georgia after his junior
year and played one season with the New Jersey Generals, a
USFL team, in 1983."1 Consequently, the court struck down
the rule, in part because the USFL did not provide Boris with a
procedural device to "contest his exclusion" under the rule." In
Clarett, the Second Circuit's endorsement of the NFL's
procedural protections of applicants for eligibility not only
affected Clarett, but also affected a future crop of players
wishing to forgo three or more years of college eligibility for the
NFL. In other words, Clarett effectively cemented the NFL's
three-year rule for the foreseeable future.
In addition, the Boris court did not address the specific
merit of each justification set forth by the USFL, instead opting
to identify "the principal reason for ... the Eligibility Rule" as
a response "to apparent demands made by college football
programs ... [to] thereby gain better access to these programs
towards the end of selecting the best college players
available."" This finding, in all likelihood, had little effect on
the NFL's defense in Clarett, since the NFL has clearly
established itself as the predominant professional football
league in the world. In this regard, the NFL does not have to
worry about maintaining a good reputation with college
football programs, since the league consistently attracts the
best amateur football players."3
Moreover, Clarett's case turned on a federal court's
evaluation of the same types of arguments the USFL set forth
in support of its Eligibility Rule, including whether someone
like Clarett, having only played one (incomplete) year of college
football, is physically ready for the rigors of a 16 game NFL
and the best chance that college football players have for increased
renumeration (viz, interleague economic competition) will be gone.
Id.
131 See Rosner, supra note 9 at 555 n.124.
132 1984 WL 894 at *3; see also Chambliss, supra note 66, at 518. In response
to the ruling, the USFL granted eligibility to Marcus Dupree, a sophomore from the
University of Oklahoma. Id.
1 See 1984 WL 894 at *3.
While the CFL has proven to be a successful league, its prestige is far
below that of the NFL's.
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season."' According to Clarett and numerous sports analysts,
however, the NFL uses this justification merely as a mask for
its real motivation for the three-year rule, that college football
essentially trains players for the NFL on a variety of levels."'
In fact, the issue of Clarett's preparedness (or lack thereof) for
the NFL related to one of his chief complaints, specifically that
the NFL discreetly uses college football as an "efficient and free
farm system . . . [that prevents] players from selling their
services to the NFL until they have completed three college
seasons." '37 This was the most challenging argument for the
NFL to overcome, since the league clearly benefits from players
competing at a relatively high level of competition, albeit not
professional, in college football for three seasons."' In other
words, college football helps to perfect the finely-tuned product
that the NFL sells in the stadiums of its 32 member teams, on
the four television stations it contracts with, and through
numerous other commercial outlets: well-played and
entertaining professional football. While this argument
appears to have merit, Clarett was unable to garner enough
legal support for the proposition.
The NFL counteracted Clarett's claim of a quasi-
conspiracy between professional and college football by citing
one of the central components of the Silver exception: public
policy. Specifically, the league argued that one of the strongest
justifications for the three-year rule was the likelihood that a
player like Clarett would be prone to serious injury since he
would not have enough experience to play professional
football."' Despite the difficulty the NFL encountered in
" Tom Farrey, Legal analysis thinks Clarett has case, ESPN.com (Sept. 25,
2003), at http'//sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/storycolumnist=farreytom&id= 16237 66.
1" Darrell Trimble, NFL's argument against Clarett is weak, ESPN.com (Sept.
25, 2003), at http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/story?id=1623318 (suggesting that
Clarett is more than ready for the NFL, pointing out that the rule has nothing to do
with age and everything to with college experience. "As far as the issue of Clarett not
being physically ready, the average size of the NFL starting tailback is 5-foot-ll and
216 pounds. At 6-0 and 230, Clarett is bigger than all but six of the 32 starters in the
league.").
137 See Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 26.
The quality of play in the NFL undoubtedly benefits from many aspects of
college football, including the high level of public exposure that athletes are subjected
to at "big time" programs, like University of Michigan, University of Oklahoma,
University of Tennessee, or University of Southern California, as well as the physical
and emotional development college football players generally experience while playing
in a highly-competitive and pressure-filled atmosphere. Of note, many college football
stadiums around the country far exceed the attendance capacity of every NFL stadium,
including some that accommodate over 100,000 spectators.
" See Farrey, supra note 13. A sports doctor submitted an affidavit on behalf
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downplaying Clarett's arguments about a "free farm system,"
there is no denying the fact that football is the most violent and
physically rigorous major professional sport. While players
coming right out of high school into the NBA often sync
flawlessly with the speed and level of professional play, it is
hard to imagine someone coming right out of high school
playing in the NFL. Consequently, the pool of amateur players
seeking entry into the NFL is best served by each player
spending several years playing college or CFL football.'40
D. Ken Bowman Leads an Attack on Another NFL Group
Boycott
Another injunction case, while by no means controlling
in Clarett, suggests that a court could ultimately find the
NFL's three-year rule incompatible with federal antitrust law.
In Bowman v. National Football League, a federal court
granted injunctive relief to a group of professional football
players, unemployed after the folding of the World Football
League (WFL).'' The NFL, in the middle of its season at the
time of the folding, basically tried to boycott the hiring of any
player from the WFL until the end of the season.'' District
Judge Devitt ruled that if the former WFL players could not
play in the NFL that season, they would likely suffer
irreparable harm and damage far greater than the NFL might
endure should the injunction not issue.43 Most importantly, the
court held that "[t]he public interest is not harmed, and well
may be advanced, by the grant of a preliminary injunction.
Professional sports and the public are better served by open
unfettered competition for playing positions."'" This kind of
language clearly sides with Clarett, and suggests that a federal
judge might be hesitant to rule in favor of a large organization
of the league suggesting "that a less restrictive eligibility rule would promote steroid
use and other 'risky behavior' among young athletes who lack the strength and speed
to compete against older, NFL players." Id.
140 Id. (The NFL admits "[ulnlike top baseball or hockey prospects in a
professional minor-league system, college football players rarely have financial
assurances that if they suffer career-ending injuries-the exception being those players
with special insurance policies.").
402 F. Supp. 754, 755 (D. Minn. 1975).
142 Id.
'" Id. at 756 ("Plaintiffs are unemployed but qualified professional football
players who are prevented from seeking and obtaining employment in their chosen
field by the concerted action of [the NFL], to their financial, physical and professional
detriment.").
'" Id.
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like the NFL if it appears that an individual plaintiff could be
seriously harmed by the continued vitality of an questionably
legal restraint on commerce.
However, as was the case with Haywood, Clarett was a
very different kind of plaintiff than those in Bowman. In that
case, when the NFL learned that the WFL was on the verge of
collapse, league officials and team owners decided that an
unrestricted flow of ex-WFL players into the NFL might lead to
a chaotic and unfair free agency, in which one team could, in
theory, sign all of the best WFL players. "5 In granting the
injunction, Judge Devitt found that the plaintiffs would likely
prevail on the merits, since the NFL was essentially
"combining and conspiring to restrain competition for the
services" of the ex-WFL players, a practice prohibited under
the Sherman Act."6
The NFL could distinguish the facts of Clarett from
Bowman on several levels. First, the ex-WFL players, many of
whom had previously played in the NFL, were already
professional football players."7 Second, in Bowman, the NFL
had claimed that the boycott was initiated to prevent possible
lawsuits from WFL owners with whom the ex-WFL players had
contractual obligations." In such a case then, Bowman, along
with the other plaintiffs in the suit, would have been
irreparably harmed had the federal courts not intervened and
allowed them to play in the NFL. Clarett, on the other hand,
was not a professional, and had no outstanding contractual
obligations. In fact, he was, and will remain, an amateur
athlete until his eligibility is extinguished or he contracts to
play with a professional football league, like the CFL.
Although these eligibility cases are helpful in
illustrating the types of arguments that Clarett and the NFL
employed, none carry the persuasive strength they once did.
Federal courts now tend to favor the Rule of Reason in cases
concerning allegedly restrictive trade practices. Furthermore,
in sports cases that deal with labor issues, federal courts tend
to recognize the unique characteristics of major professional
"' Id. at 755. The NFL's resolution of September 16, 1975 provided that
anyone "under a 1975 contract as a player ... in another major professional football
league may not sign with an NFL club for 1975. The foregoing provision shall not apply
to players who are without any further contractual obligation within such league and
whose club or league ceases to operate." Id.
46 Bowman, 402 F. Supp. at 756.
... Id. at 755.
148 Id.
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sports leagues and liberally apply relevant antitrust and labor
law. This recent trend toward allowing professional sports
leagues to make rules that might otherwise offend antitrust
and labor law moved the Clarett court to sympathize with the
unique business demands of professional football (including the
need for the three-year rule).
V. SPORTS LAW AND THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR
EXEMPTION
In Clarett, the Second Circuit found that the three-year
rule, although not explicitly included,' was included by
implication in the CBA between the owners and the players.
This finding was fortunate for the NFL as it allowed the
League to utilize the non-statutory labor exemption, a
judicially created protection for rules and regulations found in
collective bargaining agreements that would otherwise violate
federal antitrust law. " It is the contention of this Note that,
since the NFL's draft eligibility rule is solely a League policy,
and not expressly memorialized in the CBA, the non-statutory
labor exemption should not have been dispositive in Clarett.
That being said, the NFL's argument that there is an implicit
agreement between the league and the player's association over
any practice not explicitly found in the CBA is relevant.11
Clarett and the NFL disagreed as to whether the draft
eligibility rule was a "mandatory subject of bargaining" and
whether Clarett, a stranger to the bargaining process between
the league and the NFLPA, was even entitled to protection
from such allegedly illegal labor practices."2 From the NFL's
perspective, since draft eligibility falls within the CBA's zone of
influence, even though the rule is not actually an agreed-upon
component of the CBA, federal case law suggests that the
league has a fair amount of latitude in enforcing such a
practice."
'4' See supra notes 1 & 29 and accompanying text.
See generally Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611-12 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
"' Len Pasquarelli, Guidelines lacking in CBA, ESPN.com (Sept. 23, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?id=1621876.
"' See Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 26, at It 40-41; Darren Rovell, Legal
eagles explain what's next, ESPN.com (Sept. 24, 2003), at http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=1622080.
" Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 243 (1996).
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Consequently, under the "hybridized" antitrust-labor
law perspective that this Note endorses, a court could examine
the antitrust principles involved in Clarett under the holdings
of a series of decisions dealing with challenges to provisions in
professional sports leagues' collective bargaining agreements
and the non-statutory labor exemption. The following cases
represent the Court of Appeals' and Supreme Court's prefer-
ence for examining antitrust and labor cases from the world of
professional sports at a slightly different angle than that taken
for traditional employment situations.
A. Brown v. Pro Football: Does the Three Year Rule Have to
be in the CBA?
In the 1996 case of Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Su-
preme Court held that the NFL could unilaterally impose a
fixed weekly salary for developmental squad players after the
league and player's association failed to agree upon a dollar
figure at the bargaining table."M While the facts of Brown are
markedly different from those in Clarett, the principle an-
nounced by the Supreme Court is very important. The Brown
plaintiffs argued that the imposition of the fixed salary was not
covered by the non-statutory labor exemption since the labor
and management had not actually agreed on the players' sala-
ries. ' The Court rejected this argument, focusing more on the
process of collective bargaining rather than the ultimate
agreement that may or may not have been reached."5' In other
words, since labor and management had attempted to come to
an agreement on a subject unquestionably mandatory to bar-
gaining (labor's salary), the Court was not willing to step in
14 Id. at 234-35. A provision in the 1989 CBA between the NFL and the
NFLPA permits each team to establish and maintain a developmental squad of as
many as six rookie players who had gone undrafted and did not make any regular team
roster. These players earned weekly salaries and were used as in practice and added to
the regular roster in the case of an injury. Id. at 234.
15 Id. at 238.
16 Id. at 243. The Court envisioned broad powers for a CBA.
One cannot mean the principle literally-that the exemption applies only to
understandings embodied in a collective-bargaining agreement-for the
collective-bargaining process may take place before the making of any
agreement or after an agreement has expired. Yet a multiemployer
bargaining process itself necessarily involves many procedural and
substantive understandings among participating employers as well as with
the union.
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and create its own solution." ' The spirit of the non-statutory
labor exemption serves to insulate certain management prac-
tices from judicial review. For the NFL in its battle against
Clarett, Brown represented a chance for the league to utilize
the protections of the exception, since the Court suggests that
an explicit provision in the CBA is not always necessary.
B. The "Mackey Test": A Standard for Application of the
Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
Twenty years earlier, the Eighth Circuit decided Mackey
v. National Football League, creating a three-part test for
determining whether a labor practice, otherwise violative of
federal antitrust law, was protected under the non-statutory
labor exemption.'58 Mackey and others sued the NFL, claiming
league owners violated federal antitrust law by restricting the
right of players to sign with other teams as free agents."' On
appeal, the NFL team owners argued that since the restraint,
often referred to as the "Rozelle Rule," was part of the CBA
between the league and the player's association, it was
effectively immune from antitrust challenge under the
principle of the non-statutory labor exception.1" In an effort to
ease the difficulty of applying the exception to cases like this,
the Court of Appeals stated that the practice is in concert with
federal antitrust law if: (1) the restraint on trade primarily
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship; (2) the disputed agreement concerns a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the arrangement is the
product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.' While the court
found that the practice satisfied the first two parts of the so-
called "Mackey Test," it concluded that the rule was not the
product of fair negotiations, and thereby failed the test's
ultimate requirement."'
"5 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 606.
".. Id. at 609.
"" Id. at 609-10, 612. "The Rozelle Rule essentially provides that when a
player's contractual obligation to a team expires and he signs with a different club, the
signing club must provide compensation to the player's former team." Id. at 609 n.1.
Id. at 614.
" Id. at 616. As for the first two requirements, the agreement clearly only
affected the players and owners (the parties to the CBA) and the restriction concerned
player's salaries (a traditional, mandatory subject of bargaining). However, in reference
to the third component, the district court noted "that the parties' collective bargaining
history reflected nothing which could be legitimately characterized as bargaining over
the Rozelle Rule; that .... the NFLPA, . . . [before] 1974, stood in a relatively weak
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Unfortunately for Clarett, the Second Circuit did not
view Mackey as controlling," and provided the league with
even more room to argue for the validity of the three-year rule.
The Mackey court's preference for the Rule of Reason over a per
se approach with regard to the Rozelle Rule was also a positive
for the NFL in Clarett." By referring to the unique nature of
professional sports leagues, the Mackey court correctly
identified that antitrust cases in this arena of the law are
difficult to line up with cases from traditional business
environments.165 By emphasizing this special status, the NFL
enjoyed extensive leeway in arguing its case for the validity
and necessity of the three-year rule in Clarett" In addition,
the NFL owners and players' well-documented, tacit agreement
over the validity and purpose of the three-year rule aided the
league."7 This consensus, combined with the Mackey court's
belief that the owners and players of professional sports
leagues, not the courts, are the parties best suited to creating
rules that govern their establishment, strengthened the NFL's
position in Clarett. Thus, although the Mackey court ultimately
found against the NFL, the foundation it used to reach the
bargaining position vis-A-vis the clubs; and that 'the Rozelle Rule was unilaterally
imposed by the NFL...." Id. at 615-16.
16 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133-34.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619. While agreeing with the district court's finding
that the Rozelle Rule constituted a group boycott and concerted refusal to deal, the
Mackey court refused to label this NFL's restrictions on free agency as per se violative
of federal antitrust law. Id. at 618-19.
'' Id. at 619. The Mackey court envisioned greater deference for decisions
made by the NFL's member clubs which allegedly restrain competition.
[T]he line of cases which has given rise to per se illegality for the type of
agreements involved here generally concerned agreements between business
competitors in the traditional sense. Here, however .... the NFL assumes
some of the characteristics of a joint venture in that each member club has a
stake in the success of the other teams. No one club is interested in driving
another team out of business, since if the League fails, no one team can
survive. Although businessmen cannot wholly evade the antitrust laws by
characterizing their operation as a joint venture, we conclude that the unique
nature of the business of professional football renders it inappropriate to
mechanically apply per se illegality rules here, fashioned in a different
context. This is particularly true where, as here, the alleged restraint does
not completely eliminate competition for players' services.
Id.
'' Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141-42. In Mackey, the court concludes that: "We
encourage the parties to [fashion reasonable restrictions on player transfers via]
collective bargaining. The parties are far better situated to agreeably resolve what rules
governing player transfers are best suited for their mutual interests than are the courts."
543 F.2d at 623 (emphasis added).
167 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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decision helped the league form compelling policy arguments in
Clarett.
C. Leon Wood's Challenge of the NBA Draft and Salary
Cap: The Grand Reach of the CBA
The Second Circuit's 1987 holding in Wood v. National
Basketball Association" also helped the NFL under the
"Mackey Test." Wood implies that Clarett, a stranger to the
bargaining process between the NFL and NFLPA, is still
subject to the CBA between the owners and the players. Wood
was drafted by the Philadelphia 76ers, an NBA team, and
subsequently rejected the one-year contract they offered him."
The contract offer constituted the maximum allowable rookie
salary under the CBA between the NBA's owners and players."'
Wood turned down the offer and filed suit in federal court,
claiming that the college draft and salary cap terms of the CBA
violated the Sherman Act as unlawful restraints on trade, and
on Wood's ability to earn his (theoretical) market value."' The
Court of Appeals rejected Wood's claim, finding that the non-
statutory labor exemption, as well as the unique nature of
professional sports, allowed the NBA and the NBA Player's
Association (NBPA) to draft a CBA that would help the league
function as efficiently as possible.'
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Wood served as a
central component of the NFL's argument in Clarett. The Wood
court recognized the potentially destructive consequences of
finding for Wood. Such a decision would undermine the
motivation to draft a CBA, not to mention reduce the overall
effectiveness of national labor law policy.' Affirming the
district court's conclusions of law, the Second Circuit found
that the NBA's rules regarding the salary cap and college draft
met all three requirements of the "Mackey Test," or that: (1)
1. Wood, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
... Id. at 958.
170 Id.
.I Id. at 956, 959.
"' Id. at 961 (-The issues of free agency and entry draft are at the center of
collective bargaining in much of the professional sports industry. It is to be expected
that the parties will arrive at unique solutions to these problems ... because ... each
sport has its own peculiar economic imperatives.").
.. Wood, 809 F.2d at 961 ("If Wood's antitrust claim were to succeed, all of
these commonplace arrangements would be subject to similar challenges, and federal
labor policy would essentially collapse unless a wholly unprincipled, judge-made
exception were created for professional athletes.").
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the rules only affected parties to the CBA; (2) the rules dealt
with mandatory subjects of collective bargaining; and (3) the
rules were the product of bona fide, fair bargaining.17"
The Wood court concluded that although Wood was a
stranger to the collective bargaining process, the CBA will
always "affect employees outside the bargaining unit."'7' In the
same way, although Clarett was not a party to the most recent
collective bargaining between the NFL and NFLPA, under
Wood, the CBA did affect him. Wood applied the standard
practices of unions in traditional employment settings to the
unique, multi-employer world of professional sports, and
permitted leagues like the NFL to construct numerous
restrictions on the entry of new employees. "6 Thus, Wood
provided a critical legal foundation for the Second Circuit's
recognition of the implicit inclusion of the three-year rule in
the CBA 7 In this way, the non-statutory labor exemption
provided near-iron clad support for the NFL's rule.' Clarett,
Brown, Mackey, and Wood all suggest that many Courts of
Appeal and the Supreme Court are willing to broadly apply the
non-statutory labor exemption to professional sports. Thus,
although the three-year rule is not in the NFL-NFLPA CBA,
the development of sports case law since Denver Rockets
predicted that the Clarett court would liberally apply labor law
in its adjudication of the dispute. Consequently, under the
framework set forth in this Note, the Second Circuit could have
'74 Id. at 958.
'7' Id. at 960. Unquestionably, this ruling is critical for the NFL in its case
against Clarett. The Wood court responded to Wood's argument by asserting that the
league has no way to foresee the interests of future players or those outside of the
bargaining unit at the time of negotiations. The court stated that this is "a
commonplace consequence of collective agreements. Seniority clauses may thus prevent
outsiders from bidding for particular jobs, and other provisions may regulate the
allocation or subcontracting of work to other groups of workers." Id.
..6 See Lewis Kurlantzick, An NFL Policy Is Challenged as a Matter of Labor
Law, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 2004, at 47 ("[Clarett] is no different than a prospective auto
worker who, once employed, is subject to the hiring and compensation practices
contained in the existing collective bargaining agreement between the [United Auto
Workers] and [General Motors], practices which may disadvantage new employees.").
117 The Wood court clearly displayed a preference for collectively bargained-for
agreements between labor and management. Fortunately for the NFL, in Clarett, the
Second Circuit accepted the argument that the three-year rule was implicitly included
in the CBA. See id. at 959 ("The nature of professional sports as a business and
professional sports teams as employers call for contractual arrangements suited to that
unusual commercial context.").
178 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140-41; see also Lombardi, supra note 53, at 39. The
NBA's CBA sets up a similar situation. "The non-statutory [sic] labor exemption
presents a formidable obstacle to any preparatory player seeking entry into the [NBAl,
lending credibility to the NBA's description of the [CBA] . .. as an 'iron-clad rule.'" Id.
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employed a hybridized antitrust-labor law analysis and still
found in the NFL's favor. In other words, the court could have
relied on the Rule of Reason and considered Brown, Mackey,
Wood and the importance of the non-statutory labor exemption
in professional sports cases in balancing the parties' interests.
Such an approach recognizes the need for flexible adjudication
of sports cases which, by their nature, cut across multiple areas
of law.
VI. THE THREE YEAR RULE AND CLARETT UNDER A
HYBRIDIZED ANTITRUST-LABOR LAW APPROACH
Despite the importance of the non-statutory labor
exemption to upholding the validity of professional sports
leagues' various membership restrictions, the NFL could have
successfully defeated Clarett's challenge by relying on antitrust
principles and recent sports league cases to establish the
validity of the three-year rule. As such, the arguments set forth
in this section assume that a court would not consider the
three-year rule as implicitly incorporated into the CBA,
thereby requiring the NFL to defend the three-year rule on
antitrust grounds. As previously discussed, the evolution of
case law in the area of professional sports draft eligibility'7'
suggests that today a court would not automatically label a
group boycott like the three-year rule as per se illegal. Instead,
because of the complexities and uniqueness of professional
sports, a court would utilize the Rule of Reason test set forth in
Silver.'"
The Silver exception first requires that an actor trying
to defend a restraint on trade demonstrate an adequate policy
justification for the practice."' As discussed above, the broad,
overarching reason for the three-year rule is quite simple:
regardless of their age, players who are less than three-years
removed from high school are not prepared to confront the
rigors of a 16-game NFL season. Although Clarett tried to spin
the rationale behind this rule, arguing that the NFL in fact
uses college football as an "efficient and free farm system" for
the professional ranks, the bottom line remains that league
owners and players support the rule.
179 See supra Part IV.
See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
'a Silver, 373 U.S. at 348-49.
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Provided that an adequate policy justification is deemed
to exist, the Silver exception next requires that three
determinations be made: (1) whether the restraint is required
by the nature of the industry; (2) whether the restraint is
reasonably imposed; and (3) whether there are procedural
safeguards in place to prevent arbitrary application of the
rule.8 ' Under the first prong, and in light of the lineage of
federal courts of appeal cases applying the non-statutory labor
exemption mentioned above, a court would provide the NFL
with much more room to explain the need for the rule than was
provided to the defendants in cases like Denver Rockets and
Linseman. Thus, whereas the Denver Rockets court balked at
the NBA's purported need to self-regulate, a court today would
allow this justification much more flexibility."n Indeed, the
Clarett court accepted the NFL's arguments about the far
greater level of violence in professional football than in
professional basketball and the league's responsibility to set a
reasonable restraint on the level of experience required for
entry into its amateur draft. As the Second Circuit articulated
in Wood, professional sports leagues are unique combinations
of individual businesses that require unique rules of collective
governance. ' " Under this approach, a court would find that the
disputed restraint on trade, the three-year rule, is required by
the NFL's structure. Alternatively stated, a court would defer
to the NFL to make a reasonable judgment on the need to self-
regulate.
With regard to the second prong, the principles outlined
in Brown, Mackey, and Wood should once again come into
consideration, since if a court ruled the three-year rule is
unreasonable, just what then would be reasonable? In other
words, if the NFL cannot set a reasonable limitation on the
level of experience that it requires for players seeking entry to
the league, can it set any limitation at all? If the NFL loses
under an antitrust analysis, is it then reasonable for a court to
say that anyone who graduates from high school should be
eligible for the NFL Draft? This conclusion logically begs the
question of whether it is reasonable to prevent preparatory
stars from entering the NFL Draft before their high school
graduation. The court would be hard-pressed to justify such a
decision, since there would be no more basis for that ruling
182 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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than for a simple affirmation of the validity and necessity of
the NFL's three-year rule. Take Freddy Adu, the 14-year old
soccer phenomenon who recently signed with D.C. United, a
team in Major League Soccer (MLS), a United States'
professional soccer league, for example." Few would argue that
Adu, largely considered one, if not the most gifted young soccer
talents in the world, should not be allowed to play in the MLS.
After all, soccer is not a contact sport, or at least not nearly as
violent as football. However, would anyone argue with the
NFL's right (and responsibility) to prevent a 14-year old
football star from playing professionally with grown men?
Generally speaking, the line of what is and what is not
reasonable is always up for debate. The federal courts in 2004
are in no better position to figure out what the baseline for
draft eligibility should be than the NFL was in 1990.
Consequently, a court should look at the three-year rule as
reasonably implemented under the second prong of the Silver
exception.
As for the third prong, the NFL would likely struggle to
show that it has an adequate procedure for dealing with
applications for special eligibility from someone who, on paper,
does not meet the three-year rule's requirements. However, it
is important to remember that the NBA in Denver Rockets, the
WHA in Linseman, and the USFL in Boris had no hardship
exemption or any kind of special entry rule for anyone who did
not meet the league's respective eligibility rule." The NFL did
meet with Clarett to discuss his eligibility (or lack thereof)
before formally denying his application."7 Although a court
could view this meeting as a mere formality and a
disingenuous attempt by the NFL to demonstrate the flexibility
of its rule, under the traditional interpretation of the Silver
exception, this meeting would constitute notice and a hearing.
Thus, Clarett had notice of the three-year rule and was
afforded a hearing to discuss his specific situation."
" See Darren Rovell, Adu could grow soccer's popularity and Nike's wallet,
ESPN.com (Nov. 20, 2003), at http://espn.go.com/sportsbusiness/s/2003/1119/
1665998.html; Associated Press, Phenom will play for D.C. United (Nov. 19, 2003),
available at http://soccernet.espn.go.com/headlinenews?id=283610&cc=5901.
' See supra notes 102-03, 122, and 132 and accompanying text.
"8 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
" See id. In Denver Rockets, the court looked down upon the NBA's inability
to furnish the plaintiff with the means to file even a "rudimentary" petition. See supra
notes 102-03.
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Assuming a court applies the Silver exception in a
manner favorable to the NFL, it would then employ the Rule of
Reason to examine the pro-competitiveness of the three-year
rule. If the three-year rule can pass the requirements of the
Silver exception, a court would likely find in favor of the NFL's
right to place reasonable restraints on the structure and rules
of professional football.
The Supreme Court mandates that a court applying
such a reasonableness balancing test must view all of the
circumstances surrounding the restriction on trade in order to
determine the competitive significance of the restraint. " In
National Society of Professional Engineers, the Court stated
that the Rule of Reason does not include an examination of
whether the rule is in the public's best interest or even against
the interest of the "members of an industry."'' Under these
guidelines, a court would find that it does not matter if Clarett
was harmed by the three-year rule. Instead, the Rule of Reason
focuses on whether competition as a whole is injured. 1
Considering the unique nature of professional sports,'
the league's eligibility rule, designed to keep the level of play in
the NFL at a premium, does not harm competition.9 '
Competition is best served by the NFL and the NFLPA
agreeing to place reasonable restrictions on competition for the
limited number of jobs available on the league's 32 member
teams. Federal antitrust law allows the NFL to preserve jobs of
current union members and maintain the high level of skill in
the incoming talent pool - two entirely reasonable and
permissive objectives."9 By fostering the skills of incoming
rookies, the NFL permissibly secures the highest level of on-
'9 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
'9 Nat'l Soc'y, 435 U.S. at 691 n.17.
" See supra notes 57 and 61 and accompanying text.
"2 Id. at 692 (Under the Rule of Reason, a court must analyze "the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed.").
" The Supreme Court's holding in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago
mandates that a court consider the unique qualities of the business along with the
extent, rationale, and effects of the restraint. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
.. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140 (citing Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v.
N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1970)).
[Pireservation of jobs ... for union members is not violative of the anti-trust
[sic] laws. Because the size of NFL teams is capped, the eligibility rules
diminish a veteran player's risk of being replaced by either a drafted rookie
or a player who enters the draft and, though not drafted, is then hired as a
rookie free agent.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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field competition and promotes a longer period of amateur
player development. Even though Clarett is ostensibly
"harmed" by three-year rule, competition as a whole is best
served by the NFL's decision to reasonably restrict the flow of
amateur talent in the world of professional football. Thus, the
three-year rule promotes competition and future players'
preparation for entry in the most physically rigorous and
financially successful professional sports league in the United
States."'
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the Second Circuit dismissed outright the
vitality of an antitrust attack on the three-year rule, the NFL
should be able to successfully defend against such a claim. In
light of recent treatment of sports labor law issues by federal
courts of appeal, the NFL's three-year rule is a valid practice.
The unique characteristics of professional football require the
NFL to implement rules that protect both the players on the
field and the high level of competition that the paying public
has come to enjoy. The NFL's Player's Association and owners
stand behind the three-year rule. The NFL rightfully enjoys a
large amount of latitude in placing restraints on the business of
professional football. The rule serves the best interests of
economic stability and competition as envisioned by the
Sherman Act. Indeed, the Clarett court properly cemented the
future of a well-founded and intelligent restriction on free
competition. As a result, Maurice Clarett should have heeded
the NFL's warning: stay out for three years after high school or
play in Canada.
Peter Altman'
"' Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141 ("Clarett is... no different from the typical worker
who is confident that he ... has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not possess the
qualifications or meet the requisite criteria that have been set.").
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